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modity  stabilization  fund:  keep  the fund  small  - less than  one
month's  exports. For the windfall  gain  oil exporters  received  as
a result  of the  Persian  Gulfcrisis  -about  four  months  of  average
exports  - the optional  depletion  period is about  four years. In
the long run, the exporter's fund should  be small,  significantly
less than  one month  of oil exports.
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Commodity stabilization funds are hard-currency  periods, the copper fund should contain less than
savings to protect against a fall in income from  one month's exports.
commodity exports in the presence of borrowing
constraints.  They also use the model to find the optimal
depletion of the windfall gain oil exporters
Arrau and Claessens develop the optimal  received as a result of the Persian Gulf crisis-
rules for deposits in and withdrawals from such a  amnounting  to about four months of average
fund by using a benchmark model of precaution-  exports.  They find that such a windfall gain
ary savings with liquidity constraints.  should be depleted in about four years.  In the
long run, an oil exporter should keep a small
They show that the optimal stabilization  fund, significantly less than one month of oil
fund is small. For the Chilean Copper Stabiliza-  exportc  But higher-than-predicted funds can be
tion Fund, they show that the actual accumula-  justified if there are externalities associated with
tion of foreign assets has been much larger than  the fund, frictions in the economy, or the bor-
the benchmark model requires.  Over long  rowing constraint is relaxed.
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1.  INTRODUCTION.
Many developing  countries  have  large exposures  to commodity  price risk because  of concentrated
export structures.  Two methods are available  to reduce these large exposures and/or smooth income
fluctuations resulting from  commodity price  movements: 1)  self-insure; and  2)  transfer risk  to
international (capital) markets.  The  first  can be  achieved in  a  variety of  ways including: (a)
diversification  of the export structure and, (b) accumulation  of foreign assets.  The second can be
achieved  through a combination  of borrowing  and lending in international  capital markets, and through
commodity  price-linked  hedging instruments. In principle, the second method is usually  prefe-red: a
developing  country  does not have a comparative  advantage  in bearing  price risk, while the international
(capital)  markets at large are better able to do so.
However, developing  countries' access to the international  capital markets has proven to be far
from full.  Borrowing  from international  markets has often proven to be procyclical rather than (the
desired) countercyclical.  Contingent trrowing  facilities (such as the  IMF's  Compensatory and
Contingency  Financing  Facility  (CCFF) and the EC's STABEX)  have the disadvantage  that they are often
only available ex-post.  Lack of creditworthiness,  in general, tends to restrict the access of developing
countries  to international  capital  markets. Access  to comn  iodity-linked  hedging  instruments  is, for similar
reasons, limited.  In addition, for  many of the commodities  for which developing countries have
significant  exposure, the markets for long-term  hedging  instruments  are still very limited, e.g., only for
metals and energy  products is there a fairly complete  spectrum  of hedging instruments  available;  long-
term markets for tropical  commodities  are non-existent.'
The limited access  to international  borrowings  and the incompleteness  of the commodity-linked
'In  addition, many developing  countries  hold a large share of world production of some of these
commodities  and the amounts  to be hedged  are often very large compared  to the size of existing  hedging
markets (for instance, Mexico's yearly oil exports represent many times the daily turnover on the
exchange  for oil futures).3
hedging markets imply that to some extent developing  countries will have to rely on methods  of self-
insurance. Of these methods,  export  diversification  will often take longer  to achieve  and may not be the
most efficient since it may run counter to the country's comparative advantage.  A self-insurance
mechanism  that may be a relatively efficient alternative  is the accumulation  of foreign assets by the
country to act as a commodity  stabilization  fund (CSF).  A fund like this was established  in Chile in
1985.  During periods of high  commodity  prices--and high exports earnings-the  country would
accumulate  foreign assets which it would  draw down in periods of low commodity  prices. The problem
would thus be very similar to that of a liquidity-onstrained individual  who also has a demand for
precautionary  savings.
The purpose of this paper is to estimate  the processes  for income  from exports  of copper  and oil,
and to derive the optimal rules for a CSF using as a benchmarkl  Deaton's (1991) precautionary  saving
model. The problem of designing  a CSF is find the optimal  rules for deposits and withdrawals  given a
particular state of nature. The rules will thereftre depend  on the stochastic  characteristics  of the income
process.  Few papers exist on this topic.  Hausman and Powell (1991), who assume a random walk
process for prices, justify the creation of a fund on adjustment  costs in the production  process of the
commodity. Basch and Engel (1991) combine the predictions of a large-scale  copper model with the
policy functions  derived by Deaton  A) when income  is assumel stationary. Their work  differs from
ours in that we derive the policy functions  in accordance  with the income  process estimated.
The setup of this paper is as follows. In section two, we determine  the stochastic  process for
income  from copper  and oil exports. In section  three, we present  the theoretical  model  (based  on Deaton,
1991) and determine the optimal saving rule given the estimated income process.  Our anaiysis
complements  Deaton's analysis  as we study in-depth  a special case-an AR(1) income  growth process-
which is discussed  only briefly  by Deaton. In section  four, we apply  the results  to the situation  of Chile-
and its Copper Stabilization  Fund-and derive the optimal  drawdown  rules for the windfall  gain recently4
received  by oil expoiters. In section  five, we present  some possil"e extensions. The last section  contains
our conci-' ions.
2.  INCOME FROM EXPORTS OF COPPER AND OIL
2.1  Copper  and oil prices
The stochastic  process of income from commodity  exports depends  on the stochastic  processes
of commodity  prices and volumes  exported. From the country's point of view, volumes  are, however,
subject to considerably  less uncertainty  than commodity  prices and, at least in the short run, are more
a choice variable.  We therefore first model the process of copper and oil prices and then infer the
process for income by incorporating  the volume  component. We then verify that we have appropriately
modeled  the income process.
We start with stationarity  tests on the prices of copper and oil.  Table 1 summarizes  the result
of the tests.  Tests are performed on prices in logarithmic-levels  and !ogarithmic  first differences, in
nominal as well as real terms.  To obtain a real price of copper, the monthly dollar copper price
(London)  for the period 1960-90  is deflated  by the US CPI index. For oil prices, we use two nominal
prices:  the West-Texas Intermediate  (WTI) price and the actual price of Mexican  oil exports.  The
former is deflated  by the US CPI index  and the latter by the price index  of imported  private consumption
goods. 2 Table 1 makes  clear that the (log) level of real copper and oil prices are likely better modelled
as I(l),  i.e., non-stationary  processcs, and that the logaritmic difference  is stationary. Only when 12
lags are int oduced in the augmented  Dickey-Fuller  test is there evidence  that the copper  price couiui  be
stationary and revert to some mean.  On the contrary, for the WTI price series, the ADF(12)  test even
questions  stationarity  in logarithmic  first differences,  but the test is probably  of too low a power as the
series is short (83 observations). From Table 1, and given  the time horizon  we are interested  in and the
2 We also used the price indexes  for total Mexican  imports  and for imported  government  consumption
goods  to deflate  the Mexico  oil price and found virtually identical  results.5
difficulties of incorporating  autocorrelation  of high order in the model, we conclude that the level of
prices s best modeled  as non-stationary  in levels and stationary in first differences.
Next we model  the logarithmic  first difference  of prices. The random  wialk  hypothesis  is a logical
starting point here.  However, Williams and Wright (1991), Deaton and Laroque (1991) and Trivedi
(1991) find that typically real commodity  price series do not behave like a random  walk and that there
is more linear and nonlinear  dependence  in the first difference  of prices than  is consistent  with  the random
walk hypothesis. Part of this behavior  can be explained  by the competitive  storage  model (Williams  and
Wright, 1991, and Deaton and Laroque, 1991)  which indicates  that price jumps due to "stock-outs"  lead
to skewed price distributions  and serial dependence. Trivedi (1991) conjectures  that more generalized
versions of the competitive  storage model  imply (non-linear)  AR processes  for commodity  prices. Given
the application  we have in mind, we model  the commodity  price therefore  as an first order autoregressive
(AR(1))  process. 3 Consequently,  we estimate:
(AP,  -,,)  -,P(AP.-1  -po)  (1
where:
Pt  =  the log of the (real or nominal)  commodity  price,
p  = an autoregressive  parameter  less than 1,
Apt  =  Pt  - Pt-I,
PIP  = unconditional  mean drift of prices.
et  = normal, independent,  and identically  distributed (i.i.d) error with a zero mean and a
variance  of a2.
Table 2 summarizes  the estimation  of (1) for the copper and oil price, both in nominal and real terms.
The table shows that there is a small (inflaticnary)  drift in the nominal prices and no drift in the real
prices.  Except for the drift term, deflating  has virtually  no effect on the other parameter  estimates  (both
the autoregressive  term as well  as the estimated  variance  of the error are unaffected). This indicates  that
3 Using an AR process is consistent  with rational expectations  (e.g.,  a no-profits  condition in the
futures markets)  because of thle  asymmetry  introduced  by stockouts.  Furthermore, using an AR process
biases our results towards finding  precautionary  savings  (see footnote  2).6
all real price volatility is due to commodity  price volatility  as the deflators  are very smooth.
2.2  Exports  Revenues
Although  piIce ;movements  explain  most of the unexpected  movements  of income  from exports,
a full description  of the income  process  requires  us to model  the process  for the volume  exported  as well.
The volume of exports depend on production as well as on the inventory decisions.  In principle,
inventories  are saving in an asset with return that depends  on the price next period (net of any storage
cost and depreciation).  However, the joint portfolio-saving  decision of production, inventories and
financial assets is beyond the scope of this paper.'  We concentrate  therefore on the income (foreign
exchange)  earned from exports and do not make a distinction  between  production  and exports (abstracting
thus from domestic consumption).
The simplest  way to model  the volume  of commodity  (exported)  is to assume  a deterministic  trend
process.  Table 3 shows the estimation  of such a deterministic  trend (using annual  data), and Appendix
B provides plots of all the series.  For Chile, we find that a trend variable can explain 90% of the
variance in the volume  of copper exports (and 97% of the variance  in production)  (see also Figure B.2).
Only a small part of the variance  of volume  exported  remains  unexplained. 5 For Mexico  and Venezuela,
however, modelling  the volume  process  by a trend only does not seem appropriate. Figures B.4 and B.6
show important  structural changes  in the volume of oil exported. Large discoveries  in Mexico in 1976
led to high volume growth in the following  ten years until--in part as a result of fiscal adjustments-
exports stagnated  in the eighties. For Venezuela,  exports  in the second  half of the seventies  declined  due
to OPEC quota's, but stabilized  thereafter  at that level.
Since volume variability may influence (offset) price variability, we verified the two-step
' For a model of commodity  price determination  with storage see Deaton and Laroque (1991) and
Williams  and Wright (1991). See Choe (1991)  for an analysis  of the precautionary  demand for physical
stocks in the presence  of consumption  or production  shocks.
5 The low Durbin-Watson  suggests  that the copper exports could be non-stationary.7
derivation  of the income  process by directly estimating  an AR(1)  process for real (dollar) income  using
monthly  data.' The parameter estimates  (reported  in Table 4) were quite lifferent from those implied  by
the two-step  derivation:  the estimate  for p in case  of the real income  of copper  exports was  negative  while
it was positive for the copper price equation; and Mexico's real income itom oil exports resembles  a
random walk while for the real oil price an AR(1)  was appropriate. The reason for these differences  is
the month-to-month  behavior of the volume of exports which exhibits strong negative  autocorrelation.
We suspect  that this is largely the result  of seasonality  and other (physical)  customs  related  to the shipping
of the commodities. We have little reason to believe that next month's volume of exports cannot be
predicted accurately by the countries. We consider  the volume of exports accordingly  not a source of
risk and we use the two-step derivation for the income process.  Future work should, ho;vever,
investigate  why the month-to-month  variability is much higher than that implied  by the yearly data.
For Chile, an AR(1)  for prices and a trend for volumes  provides  thus a good explanation  for the
stochastic  process for income from exports. The income  process has the same distribution  as the price
in (1), but with the additio, 1al drift term "'jq" in Table 3 added to the (zero) drift of the real price (J,~  in
Table 2).  For both oil exporters  (where we only have a reasonable  process for price fluctuations  due to
structural breaks in volumes during the sample  period) we simply assume a deterministic  trend for the
future volume of exports.
3,  DEATON'S PRECAUTIONARY SAVING MODEL
The benchmark  precautionary  saving model used here is based on Deaton (1991). He derives
the implications  for the optimal  saving rule under stationary  as well as non-stationary  income  processes.
In light of the empirical evidence  presented in the previous section, we present an abbreviated  version
of his model under a non-stationary  AR(1) income process (the interested  reader is referred to Deaton
'Stationarity  test were also performed (not reported), which indicated  that income is best modelled
as 1(1).8
for a full derivation).
The precautionary  savings  model  is based on the notion  that the individual  or country  faces  some
constraints  on its borrowings  which prevent it from smoothing  adverse  income  fluctuations. This is very
realistic for many developing countries, including Chile, Mexico and Venezuela. Even though these
countries  have been  receiving  some  private voluntary  capital inflows  lately--in  particular  Mexican  private
and public companies  have gained renewed  access  to international  (bond)  markets--most  of this renewed
access has been project or company  specific. There is no indication  that the govern-ments  of these (and
many other) countries  are able to use the international  capital .narkets  to smooth  adverse  income  shocks.
We assume that the government  has an objective  function  which is a function  of a sequence  of
expenditures-government  consumption,  provision  of public  goods, a social  program, etc.--to be financed
with the income from commodity  exports.  We assume  that all other expenditures,  asset accumulation,
and policy decisions by the government can be separated from the saving and expenditure  decisions
related to commodity  income.'  We further assume that the government  is risk averse. Because  of the
volatile income stream from commodity  exports and the borrowing constraint, the government  has an
incentive  to set up a fund (CSF) to smooth income fluctuations  optimally. Formally, the government
maximizes the expected value of a function of the control variable, saving, subject to budget and
borrowing  constraints.
V,  =  (1+,,6s,IBLFU(G,)  I
s.t.  F,, 1c(1+r)(F,+Z,-G,)  (2)
F,kO
where:
7Alternatively,  we could  have  assumed  that all unexpected  deviations  of total income  can  be attri'  ,uted
to commodity  price (income)  fluctuations  or that all other expenditures,  asset accumulation,  and policy
decisions of the government can be separated.  As a third option, we could have assumed that the
government acts benevolently on behalf of the country's risk-adverse citizens who are borrowing
constrained  themselves.9
E  =  the expectation  operator,
u(.) = the objective  funotion,  satisfying  the usual (concavity)  conditions,
G,  = sequence  of govermment  expenditures,
X,  =  income from exports,
F,  =  assets in commodity  fund,
6  = rate of time preference,
r  = international  interest rate.
Because  the income process X, is non-stationary,  the model is best normalized  by dividing all variables
by the income  in that period. The iower case letters indicate  normalized  variables, i.e.,  x,+, =
g,=  Gt/X,; and f, =  F,/X,. By specifying  the utility function  to display constant  relative risk aversion
(CRRA) (i.e., u(g) =  gl 1 /(l-a),  where a  is the relative risk aversion  parameter),  the normalized  model
can be expressed as the solution  to the following  two equations:
`=  max{  (1+f*)  I  (ler)  x,+,  3)  (3)
5(1r)  ( 1f,-g,)  (4)
5.1~~~t.
Equation  3 is the (modified)  Euler equation. Because  of the borrowing  constraint,  the expenditure
ratio in the current period has to be less than 1 plus the fund ratio, that is g  S  (1  + f).  If the
borrowing  constraint  is not binding,  then g, is such that  the marginal  utility  today is equal  to the expected
marginal  utility tomorrow appropriately  discounted. Because  marginal  utility is convex, precautionary
saving will result and consumption  will be less than under perfect certainty. Equation  (4) is the law of
motion for the fund ratio.
For a given process ';:  x,+ 1, we can find a policy function p(f, x) which maps the two state
variables f, and x, into the control variable g, =  p(f,, xe).  From the previous section, we know that
(conditional  on information  in period t) x,+, is lognormally  distr6uted with conditional  distribution
N(u(l-p)+plog(x.), o2)  Following  Deaton  (1991), we approximate  the normal distribution  for log(x,+ 1)10
with a ten-value, discrete Markov process.'  Therefore, we numerically  compute  ten policy functions,
g =  p(f, i), i =  1,... 10, which map the fund ratio onto the expenditure  ratio-given that state "i" was
realized.  Appendix  A describes  the btpns  to obtain the ten policy functions.
Replacing  the policy functions  in (3) and using (4), the (ten)  equilibrium  conditions  of th'  model
can be written as follows
al,,  ) axf(1f.-',  X--  (1+3)  g(5)
where wrj  is the probability of state j  occurring in the next period giver that state i occurred in this
period. In this formulaLion,  x,+ takes  one of ten discrete values. We checked  this approximation  to the
income process by simulating  the discrete process for Chile's copper exports and verified that the
simulated  series provides estimates  for the income process very similar to those of Table 2 and 3 (see
furtier Appendix A).
Figure 1 shows  the ten policy  functions  corresponding  to the above  income  process  and parameter
values et, 8, and r of 2, 0.08, and 0.04 respectively. We start with ci = 2 mainl; because estimations
of the degree of relative risk aversion  for the US economy  have found the value 2 to be in the lower
range. The policy functions  are upward sloped,  mainly  because  a higher  fund  ratio implies  higher  interest
earnings on the foreign assets which allows for a higher expenditure  ratio.  The policy functions
corresponding to  good states lie above those corresponding  to  bad states; because of  the positive
autocorrelation  in the growth of income, a good state indicates  a higher likelihood  of more good states-
and thus a higher (permanent)  income-leading  to a higher ratio of consumption  to assets  at hand. A bad
' Note that using a (discrete)  ML .ov process allows  for easy approximation  of other, non-symmetric
distributions  as long as they are of first autoregressive  order.11
state, however, results in increased  saving in anticipation  of likely lower future income growth. 9
We can see from Figure I that this combination  of parameters leads to little saving.  Savings
would only take place if either the worst state or next to worst state is realized and when there is no
money  in the fund. As soon  as the fund reaches  5% of income  all policy  functions  indicate  that spending
exceeds income (an expenditure  ratio greater than 1).  In this structure, the fund will be depleted  over
time. 10 We have also used a very high monthly  interest  rate and social rate of time preference  (A  % and
8% respectively)  for reasons that will be spelled  out below.
It is clear from Figure 1 that higher saving will only result if most of the ten policy functions
have an expenditure  ratio below one for low fund ratios.  We tried several parameter combinations  to
obtain this.  Figure 2 shows the sensitivity  of policy functions (for the worst state only) for different
vaiues of the CRRA, interest rate and time preference  parameters. The figure shows  cases of a between
0.5 and 0.8 only, which is very low compared  with estimates  obtained for the US.  For high values of
a  and reasonable interest rates, we found greater difficulty in obtaining convergence  of the numerical
algorithm.  To understand this, we need to resort to the sufficient condition for the existence of a
stationary, stochastic  rational expectation  equilibrium  in this model.  As shown by Deaton (1991), this
condition  for the i.i.d growth case is: E[(1 + r)/(l  + 6) x+,1] <  1. For simplicity,  we will discuss  the
unconditional  version of our AR(1)  growth case. Using the approximation  x = log(l +x), taking logs,
and using the unconditional  lognormal  distribution  for xt+ 1 (Appendix  A), we can express the condition
as:
9This countercyclical  behavior of saving is emphasized  by Deaton (1991) who states that this is a
counterfactual  implication  of his model.  However, recent (Latin American) experience  shows often a
consumption  boom and a drop in saving in the beginning  of recovery (Mexico in 1989  and 1990  is the
most recent exan.ple).
10 Strictly speaking  we must also consider  the difference  between  the rate of income  growth and the
rate of interest as we do below.  The statement  above is still accurate,  however.12
a 1'(r-6)  +  CT,__  < '  (6) 2( I  ~p2  )
The left hand side of equation  (6) is the expected  slope of the expenditure  function  of the unconstrained
problem while the right hand side expression  is the expected  growth in income. If the former is lower
than  the latter, an unconstrained  government  would  like to obtain  debt and the borrowing  constraint  would
be binding. Note that the expenditure  slope (left hand side of equation (6)) comprises  two terms.  The
first term is the life cycle component  of savings and is the slope of expenditure in the absence of
uncertainty. The term is positive  for r >  a and vice-versa. The importance  of this term depends  on the
inverse of the CRRA  parameter a  (the intertemporal  elasticity  of substitution  in this framework). The
second component of the expected  slope of expenditure  is motivated  by precautionary  motives.  The
higher the volatility  of income, the higher the precautionary  motive implied  by the convex  nature of the
marginal  utility  of consumption,  and the higher  the expected  slope of expenditure  on account  of this term.
Because  the volatility  of income is so large for commodity  exporters-as shown above, a value
of a  as high as 2 generates a large desire for precautionary  savings and requires a large differential
between the interest rate and time preference parameter to satisfy condition (6).  But, the required
calibration  of the model  was not always  possible. For reasonable  interest  rate and time preference  values,
no convergency  of the policy functions  resulted  for a  = 2.  For instance, in the case of (a, 6, r) =  (2,
0.12/12, 0.05/12), even the (annualized)  time preference  rate which was  7 percentage  points  higher  than
the interest rate was not enough  to compensate  for the desire to raise precautionary  savings.
To further  evaluate  the large  uncertainty  we observe, consider  the following  comparison. Deaton
(1991) presents a simulation  for US quarterly data with an (AR(1))  growth process for income and a
CRRA  parameter  equal  to 2.  For his simulation,  income  growth fluctuated  between  a maximum  of 2.5%
per annum and a minimum  of -0.5%. In the case  of copper, (monthly)  income  growth  process  fluctuates
between  -12.0% and 12.7%, a much larger range. The difficulties  faced in calibrating  the model with13
CRRA parameters higher than 1 are therefore predominantly  due to the high volatility encountered  in
commodity  prices."'
Another compelling  reason to use a low a is evidence  from Euler estimations  for these countries
which suggests a lower value than the one typically estimated for the US." 2 The available  empirical
evidence,  combined  with the fact that lower valut.z  of a still imply  large precautionary  savings,  reinforce
the notion that a low value of a is appropriate  in this context." 3 The net effect of the high volatility for
commodity  income  and a somewhat  lower  a can still generate  a higher demand  for precautionary  savings
than Deaton's simulations  with US data imply.
In the next section we apply the model to the Chilean copper stabilization  fund and the recent
windfall gain for oil exporters.
4.  APPLICATIONS
4.1  Chile's copper stabilization fund
Chile's exports are highly concentrated  in copper.  Even though, as a result of govermnent
policies, Chile has reduced its dependence  on copper significantly  over the past decade, still more than
" Of course, we are limited  by the time-separable  utility  function  we use where high RRA  parameters
imply low intertemporal  elasticity. Obviously,  there would be great benefit from disentangling  the two
parameters  as in the non-expected  utility  framework  of Epstein  and Zin (1989, 1991),  Farmer (1991)  and
Weil (1991).
12 Although  the empirical  evidence  is limited in this regard, estimations  for Chile and Mexico-in the
context of a monetary model-suggest a point estimate for a  of 0.63 for Chile and 0.35 for Mexico
(Arrau, 1990). These estimates  are not very precise-for instance, a value of 1 for Chile could not be
ruled out.
'3In fact, because  volatility is so much higher in Latin America  than in the US, the low estimate  for
ax  could very well be the result of a misspecified  model  that cannot accommodate  such a high volatility,
and therefore results in biased estimates  for a.  Applications  of the Euler approach to developing
countries with annual  data (Ostry and Reinhart, 1991) result in values  of a  of the order of 2.  Because
annual data is less volatile than quarterly or monthly  data, it seems plausible that the estimate  of this
parameter might be driven by the volatility  of the series employed in the estimations. Applications  to
Mexico of the more flexible  framework of the Epstein-Zin  model (Arrau and van Wijnbergen, 1991)
show that the RRA  parameter is around 1, in concordance  with estimations  for the US (Epstein  and Zin,
1991; Giovaninni  and Weil, 1990).14
50% of exports comes from this source.  Furthermore, since most colpper  is produced by state-owned
mines, it is a very important  source of reverue for the Treasury. Volatile  copper  prices can also  'fect
the competiveness  of the rest of the Chilean  economy  through movements  in the real exchange  rate.
Chilean authorities  have long been aware of the importance  of managing  this risk.  In 1981  they
established  rules governing  the treatment  of excess  copper revenues. In 1985  they established  a Copper
Stabilization  Fund (CSF) as part of a Structural  Adjustment  Loan agreement  with the World Bank. The
first deposit into the CSF was subsequently  made in 1987. The rules of the CSF stipulate  that deposits
(or withdrawals)  will be proportional  to the excess of the copper price over trigger prices which are
established  as two bands (narrow and wide) around a reference  price.  The reference  price is set in real
terms (adjusted for dollar inflation) and cannot exceed a six year moving average of the spot price.
Within the narrow band there would be no deposits or withdrawals;  outside the wide band all excess
copper revenues would  be deposited  (if price is above)  or withdrawn  (if price is below); and in between
the two bands 50% of the excess  should be deposited  (if above)  or withdrawn  (if below). Furthermore,
withdrawals  were only to be used for "extraordinary  amortizations  of public debt".'4 Table 6 presents
figures corresponding  to two different  measures  for the fund. The first measure  considers  as withdrawals
only current expenditures,  i.e.,  the subsidy  to grape exporters  in 1988-89  to cover the damages  caused
by the US ban on grape exports from Chile in the wake of al!egations  about cyanide poisoning. The
second measure  also includes  as withdrawals  capital expenditures,  i.e., repurchases  of external  debt by
the Central Bank in the secondary  market.
The CSF has clearly  provided  a mechanism  for avoiding  unwanted  politically  generated  pressures
14 The latter qualification  has led to some confusion  about  the exact nature of the fund-a Treasury
fund or part of foreign reserves-and several  definitions  are used to measure  deposits  and withdrawals  in
the fund, including  some covering  the accounting  transactions  between  the Treasury  and the Central Bank
(e.g., prepayment  of debt by the Treasury to the Central Bank), which consequently  shows a very low
balance for the fund at the end of 1990. It should also be noted  that there is some lack of clarity  as to
the final purpose  of the CSF; official  documents  indicate  its purpose to be "stabilization  of fiscal income
from copper receipts" as well as "stabilization  of the real exchange  rate".15
to spend funds accumulated  during periods of unusually  high copper  prices. From an economic  point of
view, however, the mechanics  appear (in addition to being confusing)  to lack a solid foundation. For
instance, the reference  price is set without  taking into account  the unde.rlying  process generating  copper
prices formation. Furthermore, the rules for accumulation  and withdrawal  do not consider  the level of
the fund as the model above does."
Two different parameterizations  of the benchmark  model are used to evaluate  the performance
of the CSF.  In order to make the conclusions  more robust, we use the two parameterizations  most
favorable to saving in Figure 2.  As mentioned  above, this implies a value for u  = 0.5, and a  =  0.8
(Cases I and 2 res,-.ctively). In both cases, the annualized  interest  rate is 5%.  However, in Case 1, the
time preference  is assumed  to be equal to the monthly  interest  rate minus 0.05%, which leads to a small
desire for life cycle saving. In Case 2, the rate of interest and social  time preference  are assumed  to be
equal.  It is important  to emphasize  that the borrowing constraint is never binding in Case 2.16 This
implies  that this case can only be valid if one believes  that a borrowing  constraint  does not constitute  an
essential  part of a model for Chile, and its results are biased towards  higher savings.
We first discuss the results of Case 1.  Figure 3 depicts the ten policy functions for this
configuration. The very flat policy functions  for modestly-high  fund ratios indicate  little change in the
expenditure  ratio as income  increases. This is mostly  due to the low interest rate assumed, which  results
in little interest income and thus a low expenditure  ratio even for a higher fund ratio.  Close to a zero
fund ratio, however, the slopes of the policy functions  increase sharply as a result of the nonlinearities
introduced  by the borrowing constraint. Moreover, the five worst states of nature generate saving for
all fund ratios, while the five best states of nature generate dissaving  for almost all fund ratios.  Since
"Independently,  Btasch  and Engel (1991)  make this point  too.
'"All ten policy functions  for Case 2 intersect  the vertical axis below 1 and therefore  the borrowing
constraint  is not binding  for any.16
every state of nature has equal probability  of occurrence, we can see from Figure 3 that for high fund
ratios the unconditional  (average) policy function implies dissaving.  The fund ratio can therefore not
increase forever but will be mean-reverting.
A typical  simulation  for 200 periods using these policy  functions  is shown in Fig Ire 4.  We plot
the growth factor "x" (plus one for clarity  of presentation),  the expenditure  ratio, and the fund ratio.  As
can  be  seen,  the  fund  ratio  is  stationary, as  for  high  values of  the  fund,  dissaving occurs
(unconditionally). For this particular simulation,  the averagv fund ratio is about 0.30 (30% of one
month's income).
We repeated  the simulation  like the one underlying  Figure 4 1000  times. Table 5 presents some
data based on these 1000  replications. The results show that the average fund ratio is higher, 0.66, with
a standard  deviation  of 1.344. The average  fund ratio is misleading,  because  the fund is bounded  below
by zero.  We therefore also present the median  fund ratio, 0.383.  The important  result to note is that
both the mean and median fund ratios  are very small, implying  less than one month  of export income  held
in foreign assets.  So even with a parameter combination  that leads to a relatively high desire for
precautionary  savings and litde life cycle saving, the optimal  fund is relatively very small.
However, a small fund may still result in large smoothing  of income. Table 5 shows the mean
and standard  deviation  of the drift of the expenditure  ratio, which can be compared  to the parameters  of
the income  process (Table 4). Table 5 shows  that the standard  deviation  of expenditures  is 40% less than
the standard  deviation  of income, indicating  a considerable  degree of smoothing  for such a small fund.
Table 5 also presents  statistics  on the marginal  propensity  to spend (consume)  (MPC)  out of income  from
exports (excluding  thus, interest income), which is obtained  from linear regressions  in levels as well as
in log differences  for every Monte Carlo replication. The regression  in levels suggests  a MPC equal to
one, which is not optimal  in our framework. One would  expect improvement  in results by using a linear
specification  in levels, since the cointegrated  nature of the regression would provide more consistent17
estimates. However, as the low Durbin-Watson  statistic suggests,  the borrowing constraint  introduces
an asymmetry in the errors (consumption  is not symmetric)  that casts doubt that this is a cointegrated
equation. The MPC derived from the regression  in log differences (with well-behaved  err.rs) provides
the correct answer.  The correct marginal  propensity  to spend out of incremental  income is thus about
0.56, not one.
Finally, we apply  the model  to Chile using  the actual  copper  price realized  since 1987. We first
classify  the actual  prices between  September 1987  and December 1990  to one of the ten states  of nature
(details in Appendix  A).  Using  the appropriate  policy function,  we then compute  the optimal  fund ratio.
This is done for both cases described  above. For Case 1, Figure 5 shows the evolution  of actual income
growth x (plus one for clarity of presentation),  and the optimal fund and expenditure  ratios for every
month. Based on this analysis,  the fund should  optimally  have amounted  to about 20% of one month's
worth of export income at the end of 1990.  Case 2 is depicted in Figure 6.  As noted above, this
parameter combination  implies  that the borrowing  constraint is irrelevant  because  of the absence  of the
desire to borrow for life cycle motives and because of the high level of desire to save for precautionary
motives. Consequently,  in Case 2 the fund is never depleted  completely  during the period 1987-1990.
Even in this high-savings,  no-borrowing  desire case, the fund should have reached a level equivalent  to
only 2.2 times monthly  exports at the end of 1990.
Table 6 compares  the actual deposits, acccrding  to the two definitions  of the fund spelled  out
above, and the two simulation  cases.  As we can see, the stock of the fund was between  $2.4 and $1.9
billion by  1990, depending on the assumptions made about capitalization  of interest (zero and 2%
quarterly respectively). These levels correspond  to about six to seven times the average monthly  income
in the last quarter of 1990 (and about 25% of annual  total exports). The third and fourth columns  are
computed by applying the derived optimal monthly saving ratio to the actual  monthly exports from
October 1987  to December 1990, and then cumulating  the monthly saving for each quarter.  By using18
actual  monthly  exports, we prevent  the high month-to-month  variability in the volume  of exports (which
we kept as certain in the theoretical  model) from influencing  the differences between  the optimal  fund
and the actual fund.
For Case 1, the model suggests  that the fund should optimally  have been between $60 and $70
million  dollars at the end of 1990  (20% to 22% of monthly  income). However,  the actual  fund was six
to seven times monthly  exports, or more than thirty times as large as predicted  by the benchmark  model
under Case 1.*7 Even in Case 2 (the non-borrowing  constrained  benchmark),  the actual fund was only
three times as large as desired (between $580 and $640 million).  Clearly, from the point of desired
consumption  smoothing, there has been a substantial  overaccumulation  of foreign assets in the CSF
through the end of 1990.13
The optimal level at the end of 1990  does not necessarily  represent the optimal long run fund
level. Equation (4) can  be rewritten, by substituting  the expected  growth rate for income  (1 +,)  for x,+,
and setting f,+ 1 equal to f,, as one of two conditions  that define the stochastic, stationary  steady state.
u  - 1-  =  (  -r)  (7)
The second  condition  for the steady state is the (unconditional)  policy function,  p(f) = £, 0.1 *p(f, i), the
state weighted  average of the equation  (5) policy functions. Figure 7 plots these two functions  for the
parameters  of Case 1.  The intersection  of the two functions  represents  the steady state value of f.  In
Case 1, the steady state ratio of f is about 0.30-close to the median value in our earlier Monte Carlo
17This  differs from Basch  and Engel  (1991)  who-assuming stationary  prices-find that the fund should
have been between $835 and $1649 million  at the end of 1990 (in constant 1989  dollars).
'3There may be one  caveat to  this observation. Foreign exchange reserves are  not held for
precautionary  reasons  only: for example,  transaction  demand  (to cover imports)  also gives rise to demand
for rew-ves.  If, during the perixd that the Chilean authorities accumulated  a too large CSF, other
demand  was reduced, then the overaccumulation  would have been less.  However, then the CSF needs
to be defined  differentlv.19
simulations  (Table 5).  Note that the stationary  stochastic  steady state for f is stable as the slope of p(f)
is higher than  the slope of (7). Therefore  for f values  higher  than 0.30, the unconditional  policy  function
implies  an expenditure  ratio higher  than the one compatible  with a stationary  f and the fund would  be run
down (in an expected  value  sense). For values  of f lower than the equilibrium  value, the opposite  is true
and the fund increases  (in an expected  value sense).
For Case 2 (not shown), the state steady ratio of the fund is much larger, about 16, confirming
the higher desire for savings under this set of parameters.
4.2  The 1990-91  oil windfall gain
The increase in oil prices from August 1990  to January 1991  due to the Gulf Crisis represented
a windfall gain for oil exporters. The income gain for a typical oil exporter can be approximated  as
being equal to four months of normal exports (for example, in the case of Mexico, prices were on
average 80% higher than in the previous  year during roughly  five months). Both Mexico  and Venezuela
did not spend the windfall, but invested  it (Mexico  used part of it to retire public debt and Venezuela
established  an oil stabilizationfund  (along  the lines  of the Chilean  CSF)). The question  arises, how much
of the windfall  should  be invested  and how it should  be spent over time.  As we showed in the previous
section,  the optimal  fund size for copper  amounts  to only about  0.2 months  of imports. The oil windfall
is much more than that: four months. This does not mean, however, that it would be optimal  to deplete
the fund quickly.
Questions  regarding  the optimal  spe"d at which to deplete  a windfall  gain of this magnitude  can
be determined  using the benchmark  model, given the estimates  for the Mexico  oil income process.  In
accordance  with the results of section  2, the real price is held constant. Since, as was shown earlier, it
is not clear what is the volume drift for Mexico (and Venezuela),  we solve the ten policy functions
assuming  p = 0.003, or 0.3% export volume  increase per month.  We use values for other parameters
as follows: a  = 0.5, 6 = 0.08/12, r  = 0.05/12 and the estimates  p = 0.48 and oa =  0.005723 from20
Table 2.  Note that because  a2 and p are both larger than those for copper,  the unconditional  variance  of
income  from oil exports is even  larger than from copper  exports. To partially  offset the resulting  higher
desire  to save for precautionary  motives  and to obtain  convergence  of the algorithm,  we use an annualized
time preference  of 8%.
The exercise  uses the unconditional  average of the ten policy functions-instead  of using Monte
Carlo simulations,  so the results should be interpreted  in an expected  value sense.  Figure 8 shows the
optimal, unconditional  expenditure  ratio, g =  p(f), and the relation (7).  Starting from a fund ratio of
four, the optimal  policy is to run the fund down by consuming  (in an expected  sense) along the function
g=p(f), using equation (4), until the fund ratio reaches its long-run level of about 0.10.  The exercise
leads to the following  results.  In the first year, the fund ratio is reduced from 4 to 2.13 months of
exports. In the next two years the fund ratio is fulther reduced  .o about  0.33 at the end of the third year
and in year four to about 0.13.  Therefore, the optimal  policy is to run the windfall  gain down slc vly:
a windfall  gain worth four months of exports should be run down over a period of about 48 months.
5.  EXTENSIONS
A straightforward  extension  of the model is to consider  the interaction  which may exist between
commodity  price movements  and interest  rate movements. If interest  rates are stochastic,  then the optimal
saving rule will depend  on the variance  of interest rate movements  and the covariance  between interest
rates and prices.  The effect of a stochastic  r is best demonstrated  by looking  at the sufficient condition
for the existence  of an equilibrium. Equation  (8) shows  the condition  (which replaces  equation  (6)) when
the growth process for income is independent,  identically  distributed:
a'I (r  -8  r  )  +  <  (8)
where r stands  now for the expected  interest rate, a2, for the variance  of r, a2' for the variance  of log(x),
and o2,.,,  for the covariance  between log(x)  and r.  The existence  condition  can, in a heuristic way, show21
the effect of introducing  stochastic  interest  rates. If a',.. is positive, then introducing  a stochastic  interest
rate is similar to increasing the slope of the income path, since an income shock is to some extent
exacerbated by an interest earnings shock (and vice-versa for a negative covariance). Interest rate
volatility  per se (the term a', on the left hand side) acts as an increase in the interest rate whui. is likely
to generate more saving.  However, empirically, this modification  of the model is not likely to be
significant. For the period 1975-90,  for instance,  using the US T-bill rate and the logarithmic  difference
in copper  prices, o2,  is about 1.08xl 5 and o',.. is about 1.7xlO 4.
We have shown in the previous section that a well designed and well managed commodity
stabilization  fund  will lead to a reasonable  amount  of smoothing  of short-term income  fluctuations. How
does  this smoothing  compare  to the results of using other risk management  measures?  Short-term  market-
based, commodity  risk management  instruments--futures  and options-are one of the possibilities  here.
Margin requirements  assure that credit risk is not an issue, and, in principle, make these instruments
available  to (entities  in) all countries  at low costs. Through simulations,  Claessens  and Varangis (1991)
found that oil futures could rerr:;e  up to 85% of price risk for periods one to two months ahead.  For
longer  periods, these instruments  still reduced  uncertainty  by up to 81%. Similar results were found  for
coffee (approximately  70% risk reduction)  and can  be found for hedging  many other commodities  with
market-based  instruments. As a short-term  hedging  tool, market-based  instruments  could thus perform
equally well or better than a CSF in removing  short-period  volatility at lower costs.  Especially  in the
presence  of spikes and fatter tails in the commodity  price distribution  it may be even more efficient to
hedge using market-based  instruments (especially  designed to remove the effects of spikes, such as
options)  instead  of holding  low-yielding  assets in reserves. It is surprising  that to date so few developing
countries  have used these instruments.
Because  these  hedging  instruments  have  short maturities,  they will  provide--even  with rolling  over22
of the hedges--limited  hedging  value over longer periods." 9 Longer-dated  instruments  would thus be
desirable. The market for longer-term  commodity  hedging  instruments  is thin, however, and, so far, less
available  (or  only  on  unattractive terms) to  many developing countries due  to  institutional,
creditworthiness,  and other constraints.'  It would appear, therefore, that the best strategy to follow
for a commodity-dependent  country would be to remove as much short-period  commodity  price risk as
possible  through  short-dated  instruments  as well as--to  the extent possible--use  longer-term  hedging  tools.
The CSF mechanism  can be used for smoothing  any remaining  longer-period  risk.
6.  CONCLUSIONS
This paper concludes that given actual commodity  price processes observed, and assuming
reasonable values for other parameters, a risk-averse, credit-constrained  country would only wish to
maintain  a relatively  small CSF, amounting  possibly to only a fraction of one month's export income.
Using  Deaton's (1991) precautionary  saving model with liquidity  constraints, we found that the Chilean
Copper Stabilization  Fund should have held only about 20% of monthly income  from copper  exports at
the end of 1990-far less than the actual level of six to seven times monthly  income held at that time.
Even if Chile is assumed  not to be a credit-constrained,  the fund should only have been about  two times
the monthly  exports at the end of 1990. The opportunity  cost of maintaining  such large liquid foreign
reserves to smooth adverse  income shocks  is too high, even granting  a high degree of risk aversion.
How can we explain CSFs as large as the Chilean case? One, seemingly  rational explanation,
could be that the fund provides positive externalities,  such as an increase in overall confidence,  which
justifies keeping  a large amount  of low-yielding  assets even when  one is credit-constrained. Part of this
"The problem  with rolling-over  coverage  based  on short-term  maturing  instruments  is that this usually
implies a large exposure in these instruments.  This can imply large margin calls and/or large option
premiums, making  the instruments  less attractive  for foreign-exchange  constrained  countries.
'Instruments such as commodity swaps involve credit risks, compete with other credits to the
borrower, and may thus not be available  to the country  on attractive  terms.23
improved  confidence  could  come from a stabilization  of the real exchange rate, which may benefit  other
sectors  of the economy  when there are costs of adjustment. Basch  and Engel (1991) explore this notion
by introducing  frictions in adjusting  government  programs.  Other possible benefits of holding a CSF
include  reduction in (a) the public pressures  to quickly  spend windfall  income  gains, (b) spending  which
either takes  on a life of its own and cannot  be reversed,  and (c) spending  which is inefficient. These are,
however, more politically-oriented  explanations  and have little appeal from an economic  point of view.
The benchmark model was also used to compute the optimal depletion rule for a typical oil
exporter  that received  a windfall  gain of about  four times its monthly  export revenues  during five months
of high oil prices as occurred  during the Gulf crisis. The paper show  that the typical  oil exporter should
take about four years to deplete  this large a windfall  gain.
Our paper complements  Deaton (1991) by providing an in-depth study of the AR(1) growth
process for income.  We show that, even for risk aversion Parameters  less than 1, the much higher
volatility  encountered  in the income  processes  of developing  countries  compared  to developed  countries
(because  of depending  on volatile commodity  prices) implies  high levels of precautionary  savings.
Finally, future work which deals with the use of self-insurance  schemes such as commodity
stabilization  funds should  take into account  the existence  of commodity-linked  contingent  instruments  and
present an integrated  analysis, given  the possible substitutability  and complementarity  between the two.
Especially  the benefits  of market-based  instruments  designed  to remove  the effects  of spikes in commodity
prices, such as options, needs to be explored. Further analysis  of the volume and the price components
of income  risk is another  fruitful research  avenue.24
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Appendix  A:  Computation  of policy functions
The first step is to compute the 10-point  discrete Markov approximation  to the continuous,
autoregressive  process for log(x,+,). If log(x,+,)  is distributed  conditional  on the information  in period
t as N(j(1 - p) +  p log(xJ, a;), then 1,  g(x,+ 1) is unconditionally  distributed  as N(ju,  u2/(l  - p2)).
To approximate  the unconditional  distribution, we follow Deaton (1991) and Tauchen (1986).
First divide the real line R in 10 segments  of equal area under the unconditional  density so that every
segment  of the distribution  has a one tenth  probability  of occurrence. Let at,... ,ak be the nine values  that
divide the 10 segments (from left to right) and let a 3 =  -mo and a 10 =  x.  Every segment of the
distribution  of log(x) is now represented  by its within-interval  mean z1,...,z1 O.  (For the case of copper
income distributionzt = -0.120 and z, 0 = 0.127).
Because the process is positively  autocorrelated,  given a value z; in the previous period, it will
be more likely that this period realization  will be close to zi.  This can be represented  by the Markov
transition matrix with typical element  7rj, which stands for the probability  of state j,  given that state i
occurred last period.  Unlike Deaton (1991), and  more along the lines of Tauchen (1986), we
approximate  this transition matrix by computing
fjfj  = Pqa,>log(x 1+1 ) 2 a,  I 1 log(x,)  =z,]
We use thus the conditional  distribution  of log(x,+,),  and the transition  probabilities  which can easily be
computed  numerically.
We verify the accuracy of the discrete approximation  by simulation.  We simulate  the income
process using the parameterization  for Chile: (u, 02,  p) = (0.0032, 0.004436, 0.32).  The drift i&  = Fp
+  Aq  is obtained from the first regressions  in Table 2 and 3 respectively  (the estimate  of p, in Table 2
is taken as zero) and the other two parameters  come from the first regression in Table 2.  We simulate
1000  replications  of 370 observations  each and estimate  the autoregressive  process for income  from these
1000  replications. Table Al compares  the values from the actual  regressions  with the average estimates
from the Monte Carlo replications.  We can see that our approximation  to the true process is very
accurate as true and simulated  estimates  are very close.27
Table Al:  Simulation  of income  process:
AX  = y(1 -p)  + p  X.,  + e,
e,  is N(0,  a2)
True  Mean  Standard  dev.
Parameters  Simulation  Simulation
'U(l-p)  0.00218  0.00214  0.00332
p  0.320  0.306  0.0599
a2  0.004436  0.004277  0.00027
R 2 0.0956  0.0301
D.W.  ^  1.99  0.0326
Note  True parameters  come from the first equation in Tables 2 and 3 (a  =  +  &). Columns 2 and
3 come from OLS estimations  of 370 Monte Carlo simulations  each, replicated 1000 times.  For each
estimated  parameter  and statistic  we present  the mean and the standard  deviation  of the 1000  replications.
For the simulations  underlying  Figures  5 and 6 and Table 6, we first classify  the actual  realization
of the logarithmic  difference  of real copper prices  between  September  1987  and December 1990 (adding
the drift u = 0.0032) so one of the ten intervals  of the unconditional  distribution.
The ten policy functions  are computed  by iterating equation  (5) in the text, which as discussed
by Deaton (1991), are contraction  mappings  for some sets of parameters.28
Appendix& Commodity  Production  and Exports for Chile, Mexico  and Venezuela  (volumes)
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Table 1:  Integration  tests for real commodity  prices.  Are the series stationary?
DF  ADF(4)  ADF(12)
C  CT  C  CT  C  CT  #obs
Real Copper Price
log level  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  YES(*)  372
log. diff.  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  371
Real Oil Price West-Texas  Interm.
log level  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  83
log. diff.  YES  YES  YES  YES  NO  NO  82
Real Oil Price for Mexico
log level  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  132
log. diff.  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  131
Note:  Dickey-Fuller  (DF)  and Augmented  Dickey-Fuller  (ADF)  tests  at 5  %  critical  value.  Applied  to the log  of the
level  of prices  and logarithmic  difference  of prices. The  nominal  copper  (1960.01-1990.12)  and the  West-Texas
intermediate  oil price  (1984.01-1990.12)  are deflated  by the US CPI. An index  of imported  private  consumption
goods  is used  to deflate  the  oil price  for Mexico  (1980.01-1990.12).  'C' means  that only the  constant  is included
in the  test; 'CT' means  constant  as well  as trend  are  included  in the  test. The  critical  values  for the  tests  come  from
Mackinnon  (1990).  (*)  Reject  at 10%  critical  value.
Sources: Banco  de Mexico, lIndicadores  Economicos';  IMF, International  Financial  Statistics  data  base.
Table 2:  Estimation  of commodity  price processes
A log(p,) =  1p(1 - p) +  p A log(p,.1)  +  e,
e, is N(0, o2)
R2
A,  (1 - ,3)  p  (02)  DW
Real copper price  -0.00057  0.320  0.10  1.88
(-0.17)  (6.47)  (0.004436)
Nominal  copper price  0.00222  0.317  0.10  1.88
(0.64)  (6.41)  (0.004417)
Real oil price WTI  -0.00367  0.356  0.12  1.82
(-0.35)  (3.34)  (0.008841)
Nominal  oil price WTI  -0.00160  0.364  0.13  1.82
(-. 15)  (3.42)  (0.008980)
Real oil price Mexico  -0.00323  0.483  0.23  1.78
(-0.48)  (6.11)  (0.005723)
Nominal  oil price Mexico  -0.00188  0.493  0.23  1.79
(4.28)  (6.26)  (0.005727)
Not:  t-statistics  in parentheses.
Source:  IMF-Intenational  Financial  Statistics  data  set;  Banco  de Mexico,  *Indicadores  Economicos".  WTI  stands
for the  West  Texas  Intermediate  price. Deflator  is the US CPI  index  except  for Mexico  where  the  deflator  is an
index  of the unit  value  of imported  private  consumption  goods.30
TIable  3:  Estimation  of deterministic  trend for volume of commodity
Log(Q) =  intercept + pq t + et
Volume
Index  Intercept  Jlq  R 2 DW
Chile
Copper produced  3.844  0.00318  0.97  1.31
1960-90  (191)  (34.9)
Copper exported  2.111  0.00371  0.91  1.01
1960-90  (43.5)  (16.9)
Mexico
Fuel produced  9.268  0.00835  0.93  0.15
1961-89  (99.1)  (18.4)
Fuel exported  9.196  0.00897  0.91  0.13
1965-88  (86.9)  (14.5)
Venezuela
Fuel produced  12.251  -0.00280  0.78  0.33
1961-89  (252)  (-9.9)
Fuel exported  12.259  -0.00287  0.71  0.31
1965-88  (216)  (-7.3)
Note: t-statistics  in parentheses.
Sources: Mexico and Venezuela: International Econoraics Department, The World Bank, Energy data set.
Production and export index is in terms of kilo tons (KT) oil equivalent.  Chile: Banco Central de Chile
'Indicadores  economicos  y sociales  1960-88', and 'Monthly Bouletin'.  Production  index  for copper  is 100  for 1977.
Volume  of copper exports is derived by dividing  the nominal  dollar  amount  of copper  exports (in millions)  by the
London  Metal  Exchange  copper price (cents/pound).31
Table 4  Direct Estimation  of Income  Process
A log(X.)  =  t(  - p) + p A logQ4.,) +  e,
f,  is N(O,  a)
R 2
1,  (I- P)  p  (o2)  DW
Real copper exports  -0.00016  -0.598  0.36  2.06
(0.01)  (8.42)  (0.0655)
Nominal  copper exports  0.01043  -0.597  0.36  2.05
(0.46)  (8.40)  (0.0655)
Real oil exports Mexico  0.00195  -0.108  0.01  1.98
(0.12)  (1.23)  (0.0320)
Nominal  oil exports Mexico  0.00509  -0.102  0.01  1.98
(0.32)  (1.15)  (0.0321)
Nte:  t-statistics  in parentheses.
Source: Dollar copper  exports values come from IMF, Intemational  Financial  Statistics.  Oil exports values come
from Bancv  de Mexico, lIndicadores  Economicos".  Deflator  is the US CPI index for copper and an index of the
unit value of imported  private  consumption  goods for Mexico.
Table 5:  Simulation  of Full Model for Chile, Case 1
Mean  Standard  dev.
Simulation  Simulation
Fund ratio (f)  0.657  (0.383a)  1.344
A log (G)  0.0015  0.0028
s. d. A log (G)  0.0402  0.00173
M.P.C in level  1.000  0.00672
- Durbin-Watson  1.46  0.189
M.P.C  in log diff.  0.559  0.0146
- Durbin-Watson  2.01  0.0540
Note: Mean and standard deviation  of 1000 replications  of the simulated  model with 200 observations  in each
replication. M.P.C. is the marginal  propensity  to consume  (spend)  out of income from exports. It is obtained  by
a linear OLS regression between  the simulated  expenditure  sequence  and income sequence. In the first case the
regression  is in levels  and in the second  in growth  innovations  (log differences). In both cases we report  below the
M.P.C the Durbin-Watson  statistic  from the OLS regression.
(a) median  (midpoint)32
Table 6: Comparison  of actual  and optimum quarterly  deposits in Copper Stabilization  Fund for Chile
(millions  of US dollars)
Deposits  Deposits
Net of  Net of
Expenditure  Expenditure
Withdrawals  + Capitald  Model  Model
(grape crisis) 0 Withdrawals  Case 1  Case 2
1987.IV  26.36  26.36  -2.37  21.76
1988.1  125.43  125.34  21.45  51.24
1988.11  146.95  146.95  -1.71  33.34
1988.111  140.77  140.77  2.63  37.01
1988.IV  82.85  -87.15  -28.65  13.90
1989.1  467.51  467.51  18.11  58.24
1989.11  112.17  112.17  34.31  73.06
1989.III  219.93  219.93  -24.91  26.72
1989.IV  40.40  -53.16  33.92  82.41
1990.1  263.34  263.34  -10.46  25.50
1990.1I  79.65  79.65  3.32  49.81
1990.111  229.32  229.32  -18.77  27.08
1990.1V  239.76  239.76  36.07  76.56
Fund 1  2174.4  1910.9  62.9  576.60
Fund 2a  2419.7  2119.3  69.1  643.40
Fund  1/Expb.
(months)  6.7  6.0  0.20  1.8
Fund 2/Expb.
(months)  7.6  6.6  0.22  2.0
Nots  : Fund  1 is the  stock  of assets  at the  end  of the  period  without  interest  capitalizations.  Fund  2 uses  a
quaterly  nominal  interest  of 2  %.
b: The  average  monthly  copper  exports  in the  last  quarter  of 1990  were  US$320  million.
c: Funds  were  used  to smooth  out  the  effects  of the  grape  crisis  by  allowing  exporters  to purchase  debt
inatruments  in the  secondary  market  and  then  reseU  them  to the  Central  Bank  at  a price  close  to  par.
d:  The  goverment  repurchased  external  debt  of the  Central  Bank  (in the  amount  of $252.3  million).  Other
"accounting'  transactions  between  the  Treasury  and  the  Central  Bank  are  not  considered.  Source:  Fund  figures:
Ministry  of Finance;  Copper  exports:  Central  Bank,  'Monthly  Bouletin-33
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Figure  1:  Policy  Functions,  g  =  p(f),  for  a  given  state
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Figure  2:
Sensitivity  of  Policy  Functions  (worst  state  only)
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Figure  3:  Policy  functions  base  simuiation  case
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Figure  4:  Typical  simulation  for  Chile
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Actual  Simulation  for  Chile:  1987-1990,  Case  1
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Figure  6:
Actual  Simulation  for  Chile:  1987-1990,  Case  2
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Figure  7:  Long-Run  Fund  Level  for  Chile,  Case  1
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Figure  8:
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